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The “right to know” has emerged in public
health practice as a result of the devastating
consequences from major accidents, such as
the release of isocyanate in Bhopal, India,
which killed 8,000 people and injured 50,000
(Hook and Lucier 2000). The accident is still
causing health impacts (Dhara et al. 2002).
In practical terms, the right to know has
emerged in both the community and the
workplace from an obligation that people
should be informed of the risks they face in
their daily lives (Baram and Partan 1990;
Hook and Lucier 2000).
Within a narrow scope of risk communi-
cation, the right to know requires communi-
cation with the public about risks through
one-way communication, as in health advi-
sories, and two-way communication in spe-
ciﬁc situations (Lambert 1999). Both follow
the “reasonable person standard” for devel-
oping and communicating information.
However, the right to know should not be
limited to catastrophic considerations, but
should inﬂuence all public and environmen-
tal health practices, including environmental
justice (Hook and Lucier 2000). Therefore,
the right to know needs to be placed within
the context of public and environmental
health ethics. 
The solutions we seek for the practical
problems of moral choice depend on the
perspective framework that we use (e.g.,
consequential ethics, deontological ethics,
and environmental justice). We develop the 
perspective of relational ethics grounded in
fostering autonomy as the basis for the right
to know, environmental justice, and commu-




From a consequential perspective, the right-
ness or wrongness of any act depends entirely
on its consequences. Consequentialism in its
simplest form is the moral perspective that
the right action in any given situation is the
one that will produce the best overall conse-
quences, when judged from an impersonal
standpoint that gives equal weight to the
interests of everyone. All variations of conse-
quentialism share the seductive idea that, so
far as morality is concerned, people ought to
produce the “greatest good for the greatest
number,” which implies we minimize evil
and maximize good at the lowest possible
cost. In the Canadian Journal of Public
Health, this maxim has been stated as the
theoretical ground of public health ethics
(Bates 1936, Schwenger 1977).
This perspective has been subject to three
particularly inﬂuential objections, which have
a significant impact on public health ethics.
First, consequentialism allows immoral acts if
the act is expected to produce the net greatest
good, that is, it allows some people to be
harmed to serve the greater good (Scheffer
1998). In many regions, the harmed tend to
be the marginalized segments of society. An
example from public health practice in the
United States is the Tuskegee syphilis experi-
ment conducted on 399 African Americans
from 1932 to 1972 (Adams 2002). The U.S.
Public Health Service denied the men treat-
ment in order to evaluate their symptoms of
syphilis and follow the natural history of the
disease; in this case, the disease remained
untreated long after effective treatment was
developed. From a consequential perspective,
this experiment could be considered benefi-
cial because it promoted knowledge of the
disease, which in the long run would beneﬁt
American society as a whole. In Canada, the
Alberta government conducted a eugenics
program involving the sterilization of people
determined to be “unfit” for procreation
because of alleged inadequate mental develop-
ment (Caulfield and Robertson 1996). The
underlying concern in both of these examples
is that individuals were not respected as hav-
ing value as ends in themselves, but rather as
a means to some other end in which they
were not given a choice. The people in the
Tuskegee study were treated as a means to the
end of understanding syphilis, and those in
Alberta were seen as a means to increasing the
society’s intelligence.
Second, consequentialism gives no direct
weight to considerations of justice or fairness
in the distribution of goods and harms
(Scheffer 1998). An example of this is the
emergence of the concept of environmental
justice. In the United States, a large propor-
tion of impoverished people from various eth-
nic groups live near hazardous facilities and
waste sites (Perlin 2001). The emerging liter-
ature documents other serious environmental
inequities in the areas of lead poisoning, air
pollution, groundwater contamination,
poor-quality drinking water, consumption
of contaminated fish, habitat destruction,
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Research Commentaryclean-up of Superfund sites, and unequal
enforcement of environmental laws (Lee
2002).
Third, in decision making we frequently
do not have the knowledge (are “under igno-
rance”) to assign consequences, let alone the
probabilities of consequences. Risk assessment
has emerged as the fundamental tool in deﬁn-
ing potential consequences. The results of risk
assessments have been used to determine
acceptable risk to hazards from industrial facil-
ities in communities and acceptable levels of
toxicants in environmental media, to rank
pollutants of concern, and to rank which con-
taminated sites pose the greatest risks and
therefore need to be addressed with greatest
priority. The fundamental assumption is that
we know the potential goods and harms and
by technical deﬁnition of risk, we can assign
them probabilities. Thus a consequential
analysis can occur, and people can be exposed
without harm.
However, certain consequences and prob-
abilities occur only in card or dice games.
Technology brings into being new and unex-
pected consequences. Between the deeds and
their consequences there is a huge distance,
both in time and space, such that we cannot
fathom the unanticipated consequences.
Examples from environmental practice illus-
trate the nature of things: estrogenic qualities
of chemicals, destruction of the ozone layer,
and global warming. Therefore, these conse-
quences cannot be an explicit part of our
moral consideration. This necessitates that we
think of risk as broader than probability to
include “decision under ignorance,” and
develop our ethical perspective accordingly.
The Deontological Perspective
Deontology is a duty-based ethic; actions are
considered morally good if they follow from a
duty or principle prescribed by reason, princi-
ples, or normative standards, not from the
consequences the action produces. From a
deontological perspective, certain acts are
right or wrong in themselves, and not neces-
sarily from the consequences they produce.
Deontology is not as strong as absolutism,
which claims that certain acts are right or
wrong regardless of consequences. Arguably,
deontology has been a part of public health
practice since the ancient Greeks (Lambert
1998). In 1875, public health organizations
in Canada grounded their perspective on the
principle of prevention and duty to the public
(Lambert et al. 1999).
One influential deontological theory is
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Rawls
1971). In short, Rawls argued that objective
individuals, ignorant of their position in a
society, would chose fair principles of justice
that would maximize the benefits of those
“worst off in society,” rather than promote
the utilitarian principle of “greatest good for
the greatest number.” For example, if we
were choosing rules to regulate society, jus-
tice as fairness would dictate everyone should
be entitled to a minimum standard of health
care and environmental standards. In con-
trast, utilitarian or consequential principles
may dictate that some individuals have no
health care and others have excellent care,
that some live in extreme pollution while
others live in an excellent environment, if the
average aggregate good is maximized.
In current principle-based bioethics, four
principles have emerged as the basis of the
deontological approach (Beauchamp and
Childress 1989). These are the modern ver-
sions of the ancient complementary ethical
principles of beneﬁcence (promote the good,
prevent evil or harm, remove evil or harm)
and non-maleficence (to not inflict evil or
harm), and the principles of respect for per-
sonal autonomy and justice as fairness.
In public and environmental health, the
principle of prevention has dominated,
arguably, grounded in the concept of risk
(deﬁned as probability). This ethical principle
must be broadened analogously to the con-
cept of risk to include ignorance. In that
respect, we see the precautionary principle
(Kriebel et al. 2001). In short, the precau-
tionary principle says that when an activity
raises threats of harm to human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should
be taken, even if some cause-and-effect rela-
tionships are not fully established. Thus, an
ethical principle of prevention and precaution
reflects risk as a spectrum from certainty to
probability and to ignorance.
Relational Ethics and Fostering
Autonomy Through Mutually
Respectful Relationships
Both of the theories described above are
rationalistic theories about generalized indi-
viduals: the subject of the theory is an
abstract person—someone who we cannot in
principle know in any detail, not a specific
individual in a specific context. Both per-
spectives seek general moral rules, which can
be broadly applied to regulate human affairs.
From this perspective, all we need to do is
ﬁnd the right rule or the right prescription to
solve our problems as a whole. However,
should our ethical perspective in public
health be narrowed to defining the perfect
game? 
We argue that public health and environ-
mental ethics should be grounded in particu-
lar human relationships and our ongoing
relationship with the environment. Relational
ethics is person specific; relationships and
contextual details take precedence (Lambert
1998). It is through the experience of
inequality and interconnection that gives
rise to the critical importance of relationships.
The seed of morality arises from competing
moral impulses found in the particular
moment in relationship with another person
or the environment. To some degree, moral
phenomena are not rational, regular, or repet-
itive, nor are they conveniently captured by
rules of practice. The perspectives—rational
and irrational, abstract and contextual—are
conceptions of moral reasoning that coexist to
help deﬁne what is ethical. Relational ethics is
grounded in all of these conceptions. Central
to this perspective is the principle of fostering
autonomy through mutually respectful rela-
tionships, which we see as the root of rela-
tional ethics. Intuitions of this perspective
have developed in this century in the
Canadian Journal of Public Health (Lambert
et al. 1999).
The perspective of fostering autonomy
develops from contrasting two extreme con-
ceptions of relationships that have emerged.
At one pole stands the “healthcare provider
stand-alone/paternalism-beneﬁcence” model,
which was dominant for most medical/public
health practice for nearly 2,500 years (Laine
and Davidoff 1996; Pelligrino 1993). At the
other pole is the “person stand-alone auton-
omy” model, in which individuals are given
complete decision-making authority. The
“person stand-alone autonomy” model
embraces the idea of autonomy as noninter-
ference, generally held in nondirective coun-
seling, neutral risk communication, and
consumer models of health care. We see fos-
tering autonomy as the middle ground,
where neither the person, community, nor
healthcare provider are alone, but each co-
exist in relationship in making decisions
through genuine dialogue.
Fostering autonomy through mutually
respectful relationships has five elements: a)
developing and maintaining an open mind;
b) developing one’s own perspective; c) seek-
ing the opportunity for creative insight and
new facts to modify one’s prior perspective;
d) seeking the opportunity for expression of
the perspectives of others; and e) generating
motivation to care for each other and the
environment. These five elements of foster-
ing autonomy have been drawn from a
number of sources, in particular Socrates
(Lambert 1998). Of note, it is each person
in the relationship whose autonomy is being
fostered (i.e., the public, public health and
environmental scientists, government offi-
cials, and industrial representatives). Central
to the concept is people “being-for-others”
in the relationship and turning to others for
genuine dialogue about public and environ-
mental health. In this respect, fostering
autonomy is an “end” in the right-to-know
process or the discourse on environmental
justice.
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Disaster Planning and Emergency
Response
In most disasters, the exposures are acute and
can be at high concentrations, such as the
Bhopal disaster. Ashford (1988) suggested
that the impetus to inform the public can be
related to the certainty in the causal relation-
ship. When we are certain of causation, then
we can apply the principle of prevention
without much difﬁculty, because perhaps the
facts will speak for themselves. But when do
the facts speak for themselves? When does the
public have a right to know and a right to say
what should be done? Rescue only comes
when hazard is reckoned with.
The right to know means that communi-
ties should be involved in developing and
understanding preventative emergency
responses for their communities, regardless of
the probabilities of failure. Prevention is gen-
erally considered the superior principle that
guides action. Preventive planning involves
multiple agencies in the community, not only
the public living in close proximity. In plan-
ning future facilities and residential neighbor-
hoods, the right to know provides the impetus
to create and maintain a uniﬁed network for
public and environmental health, community
planning, and development. However, should
any community be situated in close proximity
to very hazardous facilities?
Morgan and Lave (1990) argued that in
cases of acutely toxic exposures during an
accident, with certainty in the causal relation-
ships, we have a responsibility to prevent peo-
ple from entering harm’s way. However, they
asserted the use of strong paternalism, coer-
cion, and manipulation to protect people by
providing barricades to prevent exposure to
the accident; if required, they considered it
acceptable to forcefully move people to safer
locations. How far into the community does
the barricade reach? Strong paternalism does
not solve the problem because we cannot bar-
ricade the toxic emissions from spreading into
the community even if we do barricade a
small perimeter around the actual site.
In contrast, by embracing the concept of
fostering autonomy, the public can formulate
and share the imperative. The right to know
means that people need to understand the
reason behind evacuation, verbal injunctions,
or barricades. Manipulation and coercion
may save some lives, but they certainly do not
foster understanding. Fostering understand-
ing enables people to think and care for
themselves and also to help in the preventive
action by assisting other people to stay out of
harm’s way; this expands the reach of public
health risk communication. Thus fostering
autonomy is promoted as the means to fulﬁll
the principle of prevention; prevention
should not be asserted over fostering auton-
omy. Thus, the community should not be
engaged because of a legislative right-to-know
mandate, a fear of penalty, or a fear that the
public may revolt; the community should be
involved out of respect for people and to
allow them to participate in the actual care of
the community. 
Contaminants in Food 
Principles of Prevention and
Precaution
Consideration of the principle of prevention
follows from the determination that a chemi-
cal contaminant in food may cause harm.
Typically, the difference between a safe or
harmful exposure is calculated by comparing
the minimum risk values with the amount of
contaminant in the food. Similarly, with
respect to carcinogens, if the risk value
obtained from the calculation r = q1* × dose,
where q1* is the cancer potency, is greater
than the standard (1 in 100,000 or 1 in
1m illion chances), there is an impetus to
consider the principle of prevention.
For broader contexts, chemical exposures in
the total environment can be ranked following
more elaborate schemes. The most hazardous
chemicals are perhaps those with the lowest
threshold dose and the steepest dose–response
curve for the particular end point (Figure 1).
More elaborate ranking schemes can be devel-
oped by considering the total mass released,
the complete list of criteria for causal inference
(Bradford Hill 1965), bioaccumulation, per-
sistence in the environment, and atmospheric
transport. As the weight of these factors
increases, so does the impetus to consider the
principle of prevention.
Following the “one chemical at a time”
approach, there is potential harm from con-
suming ﬁsh in northern Canada. The following
compounds exceed the guideline values: mer-
cury (13 µg/kg/week vs. 5 µg/kg/week, provi-
sional standard); toxaphene (1.2 µg/kg/day vs.
0.2 µg/kg/day, Health Canada tolerable daily
intake); and chlordane (0.44 µg/kg/day vs.
0.05 µg/kg/day tolerable daily intake) (Chan
et al. 1997).
From a consequential perspective, com-
munication about contaminants stems from
consideration of whether the contaminant or
the communication itself will generally cause
more good than harm (i.e., not from a
responsibility to the people). The fact that
these chemicals exceed the reference concen-
trations and may cause harm provides the
impetus to consider informing the public.
Alternatively, there is a duty to report conta-
minants in ﬁsh regardless of their concentra-
tion, especially chemicals above the reference
concentration because they may cause harm.
This necessitates the principle of prevention,
perhaps through health advisories. However,
fostering autonomy means that there is a duty
to foster our common understanding, that is,
to create common knowledge, not simply to
report chemical concentrations in ﬁsh.
The principle of prevention has been
applied to contaminants at the broader policy
level. Toxaphene was ﬁrst used in the 1940s;
it was used extensively through the 1970s
after 2,2[4-chlorophenyl]-1,1,1-trichloro-
ethane (DDT) was banned in 1972, and was
banned itself in 1982 (U.S. EPA 1982).
Chlordane was used from 1948 to 1978 as a
pesticide on food crops. In 1988, all approved
uses of chlordane were terminated in the
United States because it was reported to pos-
sibly cause cancer and cause behavior disor-
ders in children exposed in utero, and it could
harm the endocrine system, nervous system,
digestive system, and liver (U.S. EPA 2002).
DDT, toxaphene, and chlordane were
banned to prevent further contamination of
the environment.
When do we apply the precautionary
approach? In 1950, Kay (1950) stated that 
The recent laboratory ﬁndings on the DDT suc-
cessors such as chlordane, toxaphene, and
methoxychlor indicate that these compounds pos-
sess typical chlorinated hydrocarbon toxicity.
Lehman rates aldrin, chlordane and toxaphene
higher in toxicity than DDT.
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Figure 1. Ranking of toxicants demonstrated by a
simplified representation of a straight-line
dose–response relationship for two toxicants.
Toxicants I and II both share the same lowest-
observed-adverse-effect level (LOAEL) of dose 1.
In this example, no individual organism responds
to the toxicants below dose 1. In general, toxicants
with the lowest LOAEL would be the most haz-
ardous for comparable health end points; however,
the slope of the response curve should be consid-
ered. If these two toxicants were being ranked on
the basis of the LOAEL, the toxicants would have
the same rank. However, the slope of the dose–
response curve is steeper for toxicant I than toxi-
cant II. Therefore, toxicant I is potentially more
hazardous because small increases in dose result
in a much greater response. If the end point of
concern were lethality, a greater number of people
could be killed with the same slight increase in
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Toxicant IIFurthermore, Kay (1950) stated that 
DDT and its analogues may be stored in consider-
able quantities in animal fat and be excreted via
the mammary route. 
These concerns were identified at the very
beginning of pesticide use. In 1961, 4.9 ppm
DDT was reported in human adipose tissue in
Canadians (Read and McKinley 1961). In
1971, organochlorine pesticides were found to
have accumulated and been stored in the pla-
centa in every sample (52 samples), the aver-
age being 1.4 ppm DDT (McLeod 1971).
In 1950, the principle of prevention
failed to prevent widespread exposures, per-
haps because of a lack of causal relationships.
This shows the value of considering the pre-
cautionary principle. Arguably, in 1950 there
was a duty to take public health action con-
sistent with the precautionary principle.
Although scientists did not fully understand
the health implications, they knew that
DDT, toxaphene, and chlordane would
bioaccumulate in food and that newborns
would be exposed through breast-feeding. In
fact, even now, we do not fully comprehend
the health impacts from these exposures,
given their estrogenic properties.
Mercury is a neurotoxin, which may pos-
sibly cause irreversible harm to children if it
follows the pattern of lead toxicity (Clarkson
2002; Rice 1995). Mercury is naturally pre-
sent in the environment; however, man-made
releases from coal-ﬁred thermal power plants
and hydroelectric power have contributed sig-
niﬁcantly to the presence of mercury in ﬁsh,
humans, and breast milk. Prevention of health
impacts is being taken in the sense that mer-
cury accounts for the vast majority of health
advisories issued for ﬁsh. Of these four conta-
minants (toxaphene, DDT, chlordane, and
mercury), the scientific evidence is perhaps
strongest for mercury. Actual cases of non-
lethal one-to-one causal relationships have
been observed in humans from ﬁsh consump-
tion, in particular, neurologic effects in the
developing fetus [World Health Organization
(WHO) 1990].
Kosatasky and Foran (1996) discussed the
need to revise downward the WHO lowest-
observed-adverse-effect level (LOAEL) for
mercury of > 200 ppb blood mercury equiva-
lent because the historic fish consumption
studies do not support this value. However,
the main problem with ﬁsh studies is the very
small number of people involved in the 
studies. Indeed, in a Canadian aboriginal
methylmercury study (Wheatley and Paradis
1996), the exposure population was small
(0–19 ppb methylmercury, n = 29,724; 20–99
ppb, n = 8,239; 100–199 ppb, n = 541; > 200
ppb, n = 67). Of the people with > 100 ppb
blood methylmercury, only 99 of 608 (1 in 6)
people were examined in detail; 11 people had
neurologic signs attributable to methylmer-
cury, but deﬁnitive diagnosis was not possible.
In this study (Wheatley and Paradis 1996), the
actual minimum risk detectable in the range
near the apparent threshold dose for methyl-
mercury was 1 in 100. Which risks can we
clearly see at the LOAEL? What can we actu-
ally say about causation, given the complex
mixture of contaminants?
As a matter of prevention or precaution,
should we advocate that people do not eat ﬁsh?
Should we reccommend that people eat two
ﬁsh a month from the north and 10 ﬁsh from
the south to keep contaminant exposure
within guidelines? We cannot offer them cont-
aminant-free fish from southern Canada.
Further, the southern Canadian diet is not
necessarily healthier, and the people do not
have access to fresh fruits and vegetables (Wein
et al. 1996). If we advocate that indigenous
people not eat the fish because the contami-
nants exceed guidelines for prevention or pre-
caution, what are the implications? In Grassy
Narrows, Canada, health advisories for mer-
cury that suggested indigenous people stop eat-
ing fish resulted in serious sociocultural
disruption and new unexpected health conse-
quences (Wheatley and Paradis 1996). Clearly,
the seeds of destruction may be sown with the
seeds of good intentions.
Fostering autonomy means “being for”
others in the relationship and turning to oth-
ers for genuine dialogue about public and
environmental health risks. In “being for” oth-
ers, we need to be there with them, learn their
language, in order to communicate with them
about the goods and the harms we may be
causing with risk communication and our
health and environmental policies. Fostering
autonomy brings all these factors into account
rather than simply issuing informative health
advisories based only on technical guideline
values. This is not to imply that it provides
any easy answers.
Environmental Justice
The presence of these toxicants, regardless of
the fact that they are above the one-chemical-
at-a-time risk levels, brings additional ethical
concerns. The chemicals are being transported
and concentrated in the north through natural
atmospheric processes (Macdonal et al. 2000;
Tenenbaum 1998). Thus, the environment
and people in Canada’s north, as well as north-
ern populations around the world, will be con-
tinuously inundated with environmental
contaminants such as toxaphene and mercury
in the future.
In contrast to DDT, toxaphene, and
chlordane, which have been banned, mercury
is currently released virtually unregulated from
coal-fired thermal power plants in Canada,
the United States, and around the world. Is
there really any prevention, precaution, or
consideration of environmental justice with
respect to mercury? In Alberta, Canada, the
provincial government is in the process of
increasing coal-ﬁred electric generation. The
contribution of mercury from any one power
plant could be considered negligible. In fact,
the contribution of mercury released from any
single facility would be negligible to the global
pool. However, these negligible amounts
incrementally add up to cause harm.
The environmental contaminants in food
and breast milk are challenging the indigenous
people’s way of being; their culture is at risk.
This is a much broader consideration than the
narrow risk assessment of probability of harm
from contaminant concentrations in fish or
breast milk and the good these foods provide.
These immeasurable factors are not generally
considered in risk assessments. In this respect,
our thinking about risk needs to be broadened
to include contextual factors and those that
cannot be reduced to a common metric
(Rappaport 1996; Thompson and Dean 1996).
How do we evaluate the health impacts
to children, people, animals, or the environ-
ment more broadly, given the desire to use
coal because there are hundreds of years of
potential power in the ground? The popula-
tions of the north are not beneﬁting from our
activities; perhaps from a consequential per-
spective their suffering is for the sake of the
greater good. Thus, we do not reckon with
the harm we are causing, nor do we respect
the people’s lives and culture, or the environ-
ment. Alternatively, respecting environmental
justice carries the responsibility not to cause
further harm through burning coal and an
obligation not to burn coal until we can do so
efﬁciently and without releasing mercury.
The literature on environmental justice
argues for community-driven processes.
Fostering autonomy provides a perspective for
that relationship. However, how do communi-
ties in the north impact environmental policy
in Alberta, Canada; Ohio, (USA); or China?
This case clearly shows that more is required
than simply community discourses. In this
respect, fostering autonomy applies broadly:
our duty is to respect people and the environ-
ment, and this perspective must be taken into
account in decision making. Importantly, fos-
tering autonomy must include development
of political leadership. Environmental injus-
tice is evermore embedded in our ways of
doing things; it is the reason why a continu-
ous discourse on environmental justice is
needed. If our autonomy is not fostered, we
will continue to reproduce past inequities at
all levels of decision making.
Conclusion
Fostering autonomy through mutually
respectful relationships is a means to the right
to know, the principles of prevention and
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However, fostering autonomy must also be
considered as an “end” in these processes. By
considering fostering autonomy from a rela-
tional ethics perspective, we hope that the nec-
essary tension between consequential and
deontological perspectives can be balanced and,
in particular, the principle of environmental
justice respected.
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